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on stock market creation in transition economies 
 
Abstract 
This paper deals with the relationship between mass privatization and stock market devel-
opment in transition economies. The link is investigated empirically using a panel of data 
that includes most transition countries. Our results confirm the hypothesis that mass priva-
tization exerted a negative influence on stock market functioning over the short and me-
dium term. Further, it appears that stock markets in countries with mass privatization were 
initially perceived as mere byproducts of the privatization process. Such stock markets 
typically not only failed in their core mission of providing capital for the corporate sector, 
but generated negative investor sentiment and did little to catalyze economic growth. 
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Tässä työssä tutkitaan massayksityistämisen ja osakemarkkinoiden kehittymisen välistä 
yhteyttä siirtymätalouksissa. Tutkimuksessa käytetty paneeliaineisto kattaa useimmat siir-
tymätaloudet. Tuloksien mukaan massayksityistäminen on haitannut osakemarkkinoiden 
kehitystä lyhyellä ja keskipitkällä aikavälillä. Näyttää myös siltä, että massayksityistämi-
sen valinneissa maissa osakemarkkinoiden katsottiin alussa olevan vain yksityistämis-
prosessin sivutuote. Tällaiset osakemarkkinat eivät yleensä onnistuneet välittämään 
pääomia yrityssektorille. Lisäksi tällaisten osakemarkkinoiden maine oli huono, eivätkä 
markkinat edistäneet taloudellista kasvua. 
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1 Introduction 
 
General consensus has it that stock markets enhance economic growth by providing an im-
portant source of financing for viable investment projects. In developed economies, stock 
markets promote economic development by providing investors with a potential exit 
mechanism and offering liquidity in ways that encourage diversification. They also supply 
firms with access to capital and generate information about the quality of potential invest-
ments. Empirical studies confirm these relationships and show evidence of a positive cor-
relation between stock market development and economic growth.
1 One would expect, 
therefore, that stock markets exert a positive influence on growth – even in the bank-driven 
financial systems of transition countries.
2 
Many studies confirm the overall positive impact of privatization on the functioning 
of transition economies (Djankov and Murrell, 2002),
3 but the specific beneficial mecha-
nisms are not well understood. Privatization outcomes depend on numerous factors, includ-
ing initial conditions, political legacies and other country-specific factors, as well as the 
chosen privatization method and the speed, sequencing, and timing of privatization in the 
context of the overall transition process.
4 
Privatization also profoundly affects the financial sector. Financial systems, which 
have no real function in the planned economy, must be developed from scratch during the 
transition process. As Bonin and Wachtel (2002) note, financial sectors in all transition 
countries continue to be relatively underdeveloped compared to the overall level of devel-
opment of their economies. The capital needed for restructuring of transition economies 
(World Bank, 1996) has been far greater than initially weak, undercapitalized domestic 
banks could provide. The possibilities of firms to finance their investment activities was 
further limited by the inability of most to generate sufficient profits to finance the restruc-
turing through retained earnings, a situation that suggests a great deal of reliance on equity 
financing. Thus, functioning stock markets became a necessity for firms in transition 
                                                 
1 See e.g. King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), and Beck and 
Levine (2004). 
2 Korhonen et al. (2000) argue that stock markets in both market-based and bank-driven systems provide 
economic agents with valuable information about prices in the economy and offer a means of reallocating 
risk. 
3 Hanousek, Kočenda, and Švejnar (2004) challenge results claiming a generally strong positive impact of 
privatization on transition economies. 
4 See World Bank (1996), Gupta, Ham and Švejnar (2000) and Godoy and Stiglitz (2006). Zuzana Fungáčová and Jan Hanousek  A castle built on sand:  
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economies seeking capital. Development and regulation of these markets belong among the 
key issues that indicate the progress of reforms
5. 
Besides their role in raising capital, stock markets have also contributed to the rear-
rangement of ownership structures in transition economies. Despite the importance of 
stock markets, the connection between privatization and stock market development has re-
ceived little attention. In a study on the impact of the privatization process on the develop-
ment of local stock markets, Perotti and Oijen (2001) argue that the resolution of political 
risk through sustained privatization is an important source of growth in the emerging stock 
markets. They show this on a sample of emerging markets where privatization using stock 
markets took place in the 1980s.  Stock markets in these countries were working before the 
actual privatization and the privatization method was dependent on the functioning stock 
market. This connection between privatization and stock markets, unfortunately, cannot be 
directly applied to transition economies where privatization methods varied widely across 
countries and stock markets were not in place before privatization measures were intro-
duced. The focus of this research in transition countries has so far been on the positive ef-
fect of privatization on growth
6, while  the relation between privatization methods and 
newly established stock markets in transition countries has received little discussion. 
Due to the large variety of privatization methods implemented (Brada, 1996), their 
relation to emerging stock markets also varies considerably. It is thus essential to consider 
the advantages and disadvantages of different methods ex ante, i.e. from the perspective of 
decision-makers at the beginning of transition. 
The direct sales of state companies on its surface would seem straightforward an-
swer to privatization. It immediately assigns a new owner, raises money for the state, and 
brings in fresh investment for the company. The unfortunate reality, however, was that the 
pool of potential bidders was quite limited in transition countries. When combined with the 
information disadvantage faced by outsiders, this approach proved rather inefficient. 
Moreover, direct sales of state assets apparently do not affect stock markets at the time of 
sale, and possibly thereafter. In contrast, privatization of state assets through the stock 
market opens the field to a large number of bidders. As observed by Perotti and van Oijen 
                                                 
5 Development and regulation of stock markets are now tracked as key indicators of progress in reform. The 
EBRD has constructed indicators reflecting progress of the financial system reform in transition countries. 
For more details see EBRD Transition Reports 1995–2003. 
6 For more details see e.g. Bennett et al. (2004). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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(2001), it also contributes positively to the stock market functioning through the resolution 
of political risk. 
Privatizing state assets by auction can also attract a large group of bidders and the 
successful ones get control of the company directly. This method is typically reserved for 
privatization of smaller non-listed entities. Indeed, auctions do not even require the exis-
tence of a stock market. 
Full implementation of mass privatization requires a functioning stock market.
7 In 
most mass privatizations, shares of privatized companies were placed on the market by 
administrative decision. This procedure ignored standard listing requirements, which 
caused investors familiar with traditional regulated stock markets to shy away. The propo-
nents of mass privatizations incorrectly assumed that an increase in the number of publicly 
traded companies would automatically result in higher market liquidity. Ultimately, the 
markets rejected the imposition and lagged behind those stock markets in transition coun-
tries that had evolved gradually and organically.
8 
We consider this lag to be the price these economies have paid for establishing 
stock markets as a “byproduct” of mass privatization. The key difference is that when pri-
vatization through direct sale or auction fails to produce a desirable outcome, a single 
company is hurt; when a mass privatization program fails, the entire market suffers. 
The primary objective of this research, therefore, is to empirically investigate the 
connection between the privatization method implemented and subsequent stock market 
development. Considering the entire transition process with an emphasis on the country’s 
institutional setting and legal framework reveal the costs implied by mass privatization 
with respect to stock market creation. Our aim is both to describe the situation in transition 
countries and determine the influence of privatization on the stock market using available 
data.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of stock market 
development in transition countries and discusses privatization methods in connection with 
stock market emergence and development. In section 3, we discuss hypotheses, specifica-
                                                 
7 Oddly, the reverse argument was made at the beginning of transition, i.e. mass privatization was required to 
promote the establishment of stock markets (Mejstřík, 1997). 
8 According to Bloomberg’s tracking of the major stock indices, growth of returns in countries with mass 
privatizations generally stagnated or even decreased in the year following the beginning of trading (-58% in 
the Czech Republic in 1995 and -70% in Romania in 1998). Figures for countries that did not have mass pri-
vatizations show a clear upward trend in returns (1,081% in Poland in 1996 and 55% in Hungary in 1996). Zuzana Fungáčová and Jan Hanousek  A castle built on sand:  
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tions of estimated equations, and the data used. Section 4 summarizes and interprets our 
results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2  Large-scale privatization and stock market development 
in transition economies  
 
According to the EBRD Transition Report 1995, the development of the securities market 
in transition countries “has so far been largely shaped by the nature of privatization pro-
grams” (p.164), although privatization methods in transition countries were rarely driven 
by the objective of developing a modern capital market (EBRD Transition Report 1997). 
Nevertheless, stock market development implies some connection between the privatiza-
tion method employed and stock market functioning. This connection has been generally 
overlooked in the literature dealing with the emergence and development of stock markets 
in transition economies.
9 Not only do certain privatization methods require the immediate 
existence of a stock market, but they also determine the post-privatization ownership struc-
ture. Based on the initial ownership structure further trading evolves, and in this way the 
privatization method becomes a mechanism that predetermines the functioning of an 
emerging stock market (Czech Republic: Capital Market Review, 1999). 
Although some stock markets in transition countries were reestablished after dec-
ades,
10 it can be said that all had to be built from scratch. Stock exchanges emerged at dif-
ferent stages of the transition process depending on the country. In some, stock exchanges 
were launched in the early 1990s; others were established in the mid- or late 1990s. Even 
today, a few transition countries lack fully functioning stock markets. Stock exchanges 
typically got an early start in countries where mass privatization was not implemented as a 
primary method: e.g. Slovenia and Hungary in 1990, and Poland in 1991. Stock exchanges 
were created in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania in 1993 in conjunction with mass 
                                                 
9 Claessens et al. (2000) were among the first to note the importance of institutions and law for stock market 
development. Subsequent key papers (Pajuste, 2002; Bonin and Wachtel, 2002; Claessens et al., 2003; Ber-
glof and Bolton, 2003) rely heavily on the paper’s findings, extending them to e.g. financial system architec-
ture, corporate governance, and European integration. Even so, the influence of the privatization method is 
never taken into account. 
10 The formation of securities markets began in 1990–1991 with the reestablishment of exchanges in Bul-
garia, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. In 1993, the Prague Stock Exchange was reopened (EBRD 
Transition Report 1995).   BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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privatization programs. In nearly all cases, transition stock exchanges continue to be 
plagued by low liquidity: only securities of a few important companies are traded fre-
quently on each market (Wagner and Iakova, 2001; Bodin and Wachtel, 2002; Bakker and 
Gross, 2004). Transition stock exchanges are also characterized by insufficient regulation, 
institutional fragility, and poor protection of minority shareholder rights. All of these fea-
tures relate to legal and institutional frameworks that did not exist when most of these 
stock markets were established (EBRD, 1998; Bonin and Wachtel, 2002). 
In this respect the impetus for stock market development in transition countries dif-
fered significantly. In some countries, the formation was an inseparable part of the trans-
formation strategy and was, together with the legal framework for securities trading, 
planned well in advance. In other instances, stock markets emerged because they were 
necessary to supplement other reforms, most often mass privatization. This has had conse-
quences for how these markets developed. “Planned” stock markets, despite their volatility, 
grew gradually with a clear upward sloping trend. The other exchanges overheated in their 
early years, forcing them to retrench and start over in the late 1990s.
11 
These differing paths of development fit two general patterns: “top-down” and 
“bottom-up” approaches (Simoneti, 1997). In the top-down approach, the government 
takes the initiative (World Bank, 1996) and the necessary laws and regulations are put in 
place before trading starts. Development begins at the high end of the market with only a 
small number of high-quality stocks initially traded. These securities are offered through 
traditional voluntary IPOs on the stock exchange. Trading in such stocks tends to be fairly 
liquid and as the market develops the number of stocks traded grows. This evolution has 
dominated in both countries that never had mandatory listing of securities in the aftermath 
of privatization (e.g. Hungary) and in countries where the stock markets were created well 
before mass privatization began (Poland). Stock markets created this “standard” way typi-
cally develop because economic conditions require it; the supply of capital for restructur-
ing from other sources is limited.
12 
                                                 
11 The amount of stocks traded as a percent of GDP increased significantly within the first three years of 
stock exchange functioning in countries where mass privatization was implemented (Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, Slovakia), then decreased substantially. These exchanges have recovered only in recent years. On 
the other hand, in countries without mass privatization (e.g. Hungary), the value of stocks traded has in-
creased gradually over time (from WDI database).  
12 In this respect, the role of banks in the economy is important. In the Czech Republic, companies were able 
to obtain loans from a bank relatively easily (soft budget constraint). In Hungary, in contrast, it was quite 
difficult to obtain resources from a bank, so stock market development was pushed from the inside. Zuzana Fungáčová and Jan Hanousek  A castle built on sand:  
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In the bottom-up approach, supply and demand form the rules that govern the mar-
ket. There are only minimal, if any, regulations established before trading commences. 
Where rules and institutions develop with the market (World Bank, 1996), there is neces-
sarily an unregulated market at the start before the rules are set.
13 This situation was typical 
for economies where shares were mandatorily listed following the implementation of mass 
privatizations.
14 The natural outcome of such privatization was a large number of stocks 
listed on the stock exchange governed by minimal regulation. Since such markets were re-
quired to facilitate quick transfer of ownership, the development of a stock market was 
nearly spontaneous and responded solely to the trading needs generated by privatization 
(Fine and Karlova, 1998). Taking this statement to the extreme, it is possible to consider 
stock markets as a byproduct of mass privatization. 
Simoneti (1997) distinguishes two bottom-up scenarios. Under the first, stocks of 
all companies are traded on the public market, enabled through minimal regulatory stan-
dards (Czech Republic, Slovakia). As regulation gradually strengthens, some companies 
find themselves unable to meet these requirements and leave the public market. The second 
scenario materializes when a certain limited number of securities are traded publicly and 
are subject to strict regulation. The remaining firms remain “quasi-public” and are subject 
to relatively weak regulation (e.g. Slovenia). This dual approach allows the stock market to 
develop simultaneously at the high and low end of the market. 
The top-down and bottom-up approaches to stock market creation relate to various 
modifications of the main privatization methods implemented in certain countries (see Ta-
ble A.1 in the appendix). Case-by-case privatization took the form of direct sales or share 
issue privatization, similar to initial public offerings in the private sector (Brada, 1996). 
Stock markets in countries using case-by-case privatization tended to emerge gradually and 
originate through voluntary IPOs initiated either by share issue privatization or by firms 
already acquired by new owners searching for additional capital resources (especially if the 
supply of capital for restructuring from other sources is limited).  
Voucher privatization, on the other hand, merely resulted in a formal change of 
ownership from the state to a large number of uninformed shareholders with no experience 
in managing such assets. The ineffectiveness connected with state ownership was trans-
ferred to a group of “quasi-owners” with relatively short planning horizons and who did 
                                                 
13 A good example is the creation of the Securities Exchange Committee (SEC) in the Czech Republic in 
1998, five years after trading on the Prague Stock Exchange started. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




15 Given how poorly voucher privatizations were conducted, they 
can hardly be considered “deep” in the sense defined by Zinnes et al. (2001).
16 It caused 
serious problems that were either dismissed as temporary (i.e. they would be solved by the 
power of the market
17) or that were not accounted for when privatization was undertaken. 
Voucher privatization failed to generate the new capital necessary to restructure companies 
strategically or concentrate ownership. 
 
 
3  Methodology 
 
Our null hypothesis states that mass privatization in transition countries did not affect the 
development of stock markets. The alternative claims that mass privatization has influen-
ced stock market development. More specifically, we expect mass privatization to have a 
negative influence on stock market functioning. The formal model specification accounts 
for the effect of privatization together with the country effect as follows: 
) 1 ( , _ , , 2 , 1 , t i t i t i i i t i priv t priv country ind market ε β β α + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ =  
where the relevant group of variables is defined as follows:  
￿  market_ind stands for an indicator of stock market development (market capitaliza-
tion, turnover ratio, value traded, and new capital raised); 
￿  country stands for a country dummy variable; 
￿  priv is a dummy variable that equals 1 if voucher privatization was implemented in 
a given country (as the primary or secondary privatization method under the EBRD 
classification), and 0 if another privatization method was implemented; 
￿  t stands for linear trend that is added to the privatization dummy. 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 For details on various mass privatization models, see Estrin and Stone (1997). 
15 These owners were survival-oriented, focused only on sustaining current cash flow (World Bank 1996). 
Since the immediate liquidation value of such companies was often higher than the net present value of fu-
ture investments (Lízal and Švejnar, 2001), it was more profitable for “quasi-owners” to strip the company’s 
assets. 
16 Zinnes et al. (2001) argue that “privatization involving change-of-title alone is not enough to generate eco-
nomic performance improvements” (p. 147). “Deep” privatization should include institutional and “agency”-
related reforms as well.  Zuzana Fungáčová and Jan Hanousek  A castle built on sand:  
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This specification includes mass privatization dummies with and without linear trend. The 
dummy variable without trend is meant to uncover the average effect of mass privatization 
on the stock market. The dummy with linear trend anticipates the evolving impact of priva-
tization during the transition period as ownership structures of privatized companies are 
consolidated. Such ownership changes typically took several years and, in the majority of 
cases, were intermediated by the stock market. Thus, most trades that took place on the 
stock exchanges depended heavily on the privatization method and its progress. By consi-
dering both dummy variables, we hope to investigate the interaction of the initial effect of 
privatization and its evolution over time.  
Since the implementation of mass privatization usually took several years, its im-
pact on stock markets is typically not observed in the first year of privatization. Therefore, 
except the contemporaneous effect of privatization (privt), we also estimate two other 
modifications of our basic model that include privatization dummy with a one-year (privt-1) 
and a two-year lag (privt-2). 
The estimation and testing are done in the framework of the analysis of variance. 
We estimate the effect of privatization on stock market development by considering priva-
tization and country effects together (equation 1). We control only for privatization and 
country effects at this stage as our first objective is to uncover if the effect of privatization 
is present in the data, i.e. if privatization has had any influence at all on stock market de-
velopment in transition countries. While controlling for country effects may be considered 
an overly broad variable, it contains all the country specific characteristics for which we 
seek to account. It is a far more general indicator than select economic variables. By cast-
ing a wide net, we avoid the problem of possible model misspecification, since it is espe-
cially challenging in the case of transition countries to identify those economic variables 





                                                                                                                                                 
17 Mutual privatization funds were expected to contribute to active corporate governance after the shares of 
formerly state enterprises were distributed in mass privatization.  
18 One of the most important determinants in this respect is bank lending, which reflects an alternative source of funding 
for companies. We consider it part of the country effect at this stage because bank sector development and privatization 
were at different phases of development in individual countries and it was significantly influenced by various factors 
connected to the transition process. When more data from transition countries eventually becomes available, we hope to 
conduct a similar analysis with specific economic variables that seem to influence stock market development. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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3.1  Data description 
 
Our data come primarily from the World Development Database (available from the World 
Bank). Where indicated, the data set is supplemented by data from the World Federation of 
Exchanges and local stock exchange figures. Dummy variables for mass privatization are 
constructed based on different issues of the Transition Report published by the EBRD. A 
definition and brief description of the most important variables used in this study are pro-
vided in Table A.2 and Table A.3 in the appendix.  
  To investigate whether and to what extent privatization methods in transition 
economies influenced the emergence and development of stock markets, we examine a 
sample of former communist countries. Most of the 27 states in Central and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia considered transition economies are included in our sample.
19 The 
list of countries and variables covered is provided in Table A.4 in the appendix. 
  The time period under consideration covers the transition from 1990 to 2003. Un-
fortunately, the data vary across countries, so only an unbalanced panel data set is avail-
able. Moreover, some transition countries have not proceeded far enough in the transition 
process to make it possible to investigate links with stock market development. In other 
words, this unbalanced panel is the result of “true” missing values and an absence of ob-
servations in countries without stock markets.
20  
The panel is further unbalanced by the quality of the available data. Although data 
exist for certain countries, care must be taken to examine the data before using them. 
Where necessary, they need to be cleaned up for further estimations because the nature of 
transition economies leads to observations that cannot be included in the data set. It is, 
however, impossible to stipulate the exact criteria for our decisions as they are primarily 
based on original country data. Moreover, the estimation results may be easily spoiled by 
growth rates recorded in the thousands of percent in cases where a newly created stock ex-
change traded during a time period shorter than one year or where several years went by 
before trading was actually initiated.
21 Moreover, we need to account for frequent organ-
                                                 
19 It is not possible to include all transition countries as relevant data are not available in all cases.  
20 We do not assign a “zero” value for countries where there was no stock market at the beginning of transi-
tion. Such an approach would result in an artificially balanced panel. While this would not change the esti-
mated coefficients, t-statistics could be affected significantly and through them the results of the overall hy-
pothesis testing.  
21 We see this in Croatia (stock market founded in 1994, but no active trading until 1996), Latvia (founded in 
1993, trading launched in 1995; the situation began to normalize in 1996), Lithuania (trading officially 
started in 1993, but the figures are very low until 1995; the situation begins to normalize in 1996), Moldova Zuzana Fungáčová and Jan Hanousek  A castle built on sand:  
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izational changes on the stock exchanges and other exogenous factors (e.g. the Russian fi-
nancial crisis in 1998) that may have influenced actual figures.
22 Another exogenous influ-
ence was Russia’s 1998 financial crisis. All of these problems were taken into account 
when cleaning the data and constructing the actual data set. Observations that could poten-
tially damage the analysis have either been omitted or remedied by creating suitable 
dummy variables. 
We measure stock market development using the standard indicators of market size 
and liquidity.
23 Market capitalization reflects the total value of domestic shares listed on a 
particular stock exchange and ideally also shows the importance of financing through eq-
uity issues. Under mass privatization with mandatory stock listing, however, this figure can 
be significantly inflated when the majority of stocks listed are traded occasionally or not at 
all. In contrast, the indicators of liquidity reflect real stock market activity and are not 
spoiled by a high number of non-traded stocks. 
We employ two measures of liquidity. The value traded equals the value of trading 
divided by GDP. The second measure is the market turnover ratio defined as the value of 
stocks traded divided by the value of listed stocks. The turnover ratio, which is unaffected 
by price changes, reflects the real situation on the market. 
In the context of transition economies, we also find it important to add a variable of 
new capital raised as a further measure of stock market development. Although this meas-
ure reflects the market function of providing financial resources for enterprises, it suffers 
from two serious shortcomings. First, the number of IPOs, especially in comparison to 
market capitalization, is insignificant in transition countries. Second, data on new capital 
raised in the context of transition economies do not necessarily reflect the true situation. As 




                                                                                                                                                 
(official launch in 1995, but trading active only from 1997), and Romania (started operations in 1995, but 
moderate trading only from 1997). 
22 These include the merger of several exchanges into a new entity (Kazakhstan in 1997, Bulgaria in 1998), 
the decision of stock exchange authorities to list a certain group of securities not previously listed (Latvia in 
1999), macroeconomic development in a given country (Poland in 1993), and trading system enhancements 
initiated by the stock exchange and liberalization of block trading (Lithuania in 1997). 
23 These have been used in studies investigating the development of stock markets and its connection to 
economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel, 
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4  Estimation results   
 
The outcome of our estimation is discussed according to the stock market indicators used 
as dependent variables. 
￿  MARKET CAPITALIZATION TO GDP 
Results showing the influence of mass privatization on market capitalization as a percent-
age of GDP are provided in Table 1. 
 
   Table 1   Results of ANOVA for market capitalization to GDP as dependent variable, pooled data 
Dependent variable  MARKET CAPITALIZATION TO GDP 
Model specification  Privatization and country effect 




Contemporaneous effect     
Privatization dummy (priv)  -0.56   [0.821] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             1.61   [0.000] 
0.64 
One year lag     
Privatization dummy (priv)  1.3   [0.539] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             1.57   [0.000] 
0.64 
Two years lag     
Privatization dummy (priv)  3.33   [0.062] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             1.47   [0.000] 
0.65 
Observation/country   151/20 
 
Country characteristics contribute a great deal to explaining the variability of the model. 
The R
2 measure of the estimated model has improved from several percentage points when 
the privatization effect is considered in isolation to over 60% when country characteristics 
are taken into account.
24 This confirms our expectations shaped by the fact that the eco-
nomic environment in individual transition economies varied considerably, especially with 
respect to the different initial conditions and sequencing of reforms. The use of lagged pri-
vatization dummies (up to two years) provides more significant estimates. They indicate 
privatization did not greatly influence stock markets initially. 
The estimated coefficients are positive and mostly significant. This shows the posi-
tive influence of mass privatization on market capitalization. The coefficients for dummies 
including linear trend are all significant, thus showing the evolving influence of mass pri-
                                                 
24 Detailed results are available upon request. Zuzana Fungáčová and Jan Hanousek  A castle built on sand:  
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vatization on stock market development. The significance of the privatization dummy 
without trend further indicates that there was a sudden change in market capitalization fol-
lowing the implementation of the mass privatization scheme. As expected, this was posi-
tive due to the fact that the shares of privatized companies were simply put on the market 
in the majority of countries. 
Although not all the coefficients in our specification were significant, including the 
privatization dummy with and without trend (most probably due to their possible correla-
tion), there is a visible trend. Country specifications have improved the model and both 
with and without trend dummies exhibit positive coefficients consistent with our hypothe-
sis. Nevertheless, in this case only the trend dummy remains significant and it seems that 
except for the case with a two-year lag, the dummy without trend adds no explanatory 
power. All in all, our expectations are confirmed as to the positive sign and significance of 
estimated coefficients when market capitalization serves as an explanatory variable.  
￿  GROWTH IN STOCKS TRADED  
In line with our expectations, the impact of privatization on the growth in value of 
stocks traded is mostly significant when country characteristics are taken into account. 
While most coefficients are significant, the R
2 measure reaches only one third of the value 
for market capitalization. We posit that the value of stocks traded in comparison to market 
capitalization was likely influenced by privatization only indirectly or that privatization 
may to some extent be correlated with the country effect.  
 
    Table 2   Results of ANOVA for growth in value of stocks traded as dependent variable, pooled data  
Dependent variable  GROWTH IN STOCKS TRADED 
Model specification  Privatization and country effect 




Contemporaneous effect      
Privatization dummy (priv)  0.29   [0.558] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             -0.24   [0.001] 
0.22 
One year lag     
Privatization dummy (priv)  1.60   [0.001] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             -0.29   [0.000] 
0.23 
Two years lag     
Privatization dummy (priv)  1.24   [0.005] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             -0.30   [0.000] 
0.23 
Observation/country   102/17 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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As Table 2 reveals, the immediate effect of privatization on stock trading statistics 
is positive. The introduction of huge numbers of new shares to the stock exchange leads to 
optimism and higher volumes of stocks traded. As the ownership structure consolidates 
and there is no more space for the speculation of investment funds and other intermediaries 
over the medium run, however, the influence of privatization becomes less positive. Thus, 
trading as an indicator of stock market liquidity crucial for healthy stock market develop-
ment is, in fact, negatively influenced by mass privatization and traditional stock market 
development is thwarted.  
This negative long-run effect is also reflected in significant results for the privatiza-
tion dummy variable that only includes linear trend. This is significant even without con-
sidering country effects, which once again supports our hypothesis about the long-lasting 
influence of privatization. Yet, while this effect can be observed in the long run, we do not 
consider it permanent; it relates solely to the transition period. Recent development of 
stock indices in major transition countries supports this statement.
25 Despite initial prob-
lems and related costs, market forces have tended to win out over the long run and contrib-
ute to the stabilization of stock markets in transition economies. 
￿     TURNOVER RATIO 
This is another indicator of stock market functioning that supports our previous results and 
the initial hypothesis. We consider the following outcome even more important, especially 
due to the better quality of the chosen turnover ratio indicator which is not spoiled by price 
changes or by a high number of listed companies after privatization, and which reflects the 
true liquidity of the market.  
           Table 3 shows that with the exception of one coefficient, all estimated coefficients 
are significant.
26 All estimated coefficients for turnover ratio are negative, which only sub-
stantiates the unfavorable influence of privatization on stock markets. The model’s specifi-





                                                 
25 The Prague Stock Exchange index PX50 recovered to its initial 1994 level of 1,000 only in 2004.  
26 Again, all detailed results are available upon request. Zuzana Fungáčová and Jan Hanousek  A castle built on sand:  
The effects of mass privatization  




   Table 3:  Results of ANOVA for turnover ratio as dependent variable, pooled data 
Dependent variable  TURNOVER RATIO 
Model specification  Privatization and country effect 




Contemporaneous effect     
Privatization dummy (priv)  -41.87   [0.082] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             -4.22   [0.009] 
0.44 
One year lag     
Privatization dummy (priv)  -28.71   [0.135] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             -4.32   [0.011] 
0.43 
Two years lag     
Privatization dummy (priv)  -32.26   [0.022] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             -3.91   [0.028] 
0.43 
Observation/country   111/18 
    
 NEW CAPITAL RAISED 
In comparison to turnover ratio, as Table 4 shows, the new capital raised variable 
provides us with no new significant parameters. Without considering country effects no 
coefficients are significant, and the overall results for new capital raised seem to be quite 
ambiguous, possibly due to the unclear nature of the data on new capital raised and to 
problems with its measurement in transition countries. 
 
   Table 4:  Results of ANOVA for new capital raised as dependent variable, pooled data 
Dependent variable  NEW CAPITAL RAISED 
Model specification  Privatization and country effect 




Contemporaneous effect     
Privatization dummy (priv)  -0.010   [0.205] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             -0.001   [0.205] 
0.35 
One year lag     
Privatization dummy (priv)  -0.020   [0.047] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             0.000   [0.982] 
0.67 
 
Two years lag     
Privatization dummy (priv)  -0.010   [0.131] 
Privatization dummy with trend (t.priv)             0.000   [0.561] 
0.38 
 
Observation/country   81/14 
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Another possible problem is the relatively low number of observations, especially in com-
parison to other dependent variables used. One may even question the appropriateness of 
the new capital raised indicator for bank-based financial systems that traditionally tend to 
prevail in transition economies. We are aware of these shortcomings, but nevertheless we 
consider the new capital raised variable important in fulfilling the basic function of a stock 
market, so it is included in our analysis. Its importance has increased over time as IPOs on 
the stock markets of transition countries have become more common. 
 
4.1 Robustness check  
 
In all of the above-described estimations, we included a dummy variable for the 1998 Rus-
sian crisis to check the robustness of the results.  As the influence of the crisis on all transi-
tion countries was not strong, this dummy did not figure significantly in our estimations.   
Yet another modification of the basic model is the inclusion of a quadratic trend. 
We have considered a privatization dummy including quadratic trend alone, as well as its 
interaction with a privatization dummy without a trend component. Results reveal the same 
pattern as when including linear trend, which again points to the robustness of our results.  
In our view, the simple estimation procedure performed above is appropriate both 
with respect to the data sample we have available and to the main objective of our investi-
gation – uncovering a possible connection between mass privatization and stock market 
development. Data sufficiency problems occur if we want to include the development of 
stock markets over time as an inseparable part of the transition process. In such a case, we 
would need to add a trend for each country’s development. This kind of estimation is not 
possible with the small data sample as we have presently available. When more data is 





We used available data from a majority of transition economies to prove empirically our 
hypothesis that mass privatization influenced stock market development and exerted a 
negative impact on stock market functioning. The results of our estimation, which accoun-
ted for privatization method and country effects, validated the hypothesis in the short and Zuzana Fungáčová and Jan Hanousek  A castle built on sand:  
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medium run. Moreover, the connection between mass privatization and stock market deve-
lopment was confirmed using different indicators of stock market development. In accor-
dance with our expectations, market capitalization to GDP increased suddenly following 
mass privatization. Our liquidity indicators confirmed that most shares traded occasionally 
or not at all, as the value of stocks traded and the turnover ratio exhibited negative coeffi-
cients for the privatization dummy. This trend was quite visible over the medium term.  
These results further imply that in countries using mass privatization approaches, 
the stock market was established and perceived only as a byproduct of the privatization 
process. These stock markets did not initially fulfill their main economic function of pro-
viding capital resources to enterprises. Such non-transparent markets offering thousands of 
securities naturally diminished investor confidence and did little to jump-start economic 
growth in transition economies. Despite such an unfavorable beginning, the main stock in-
dices in transition economies have shown improvement recently. It seems that resources in 
the transition economies would have been used more efficiently had a more careful ap-
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   Table A.1.  Primary and secondary privatization method implemented in transition countries 
 
Primary method  Secondary method 
Country  Direct  
sales  MEBOs Vouchers Direct  sales MEBOs  Vouchers 
Albania   *        * 
Armenia 99→  →99   *  
Azerbaijan
X  01→   *  *    2001→ 
Belarus   *        * 
Bosnia and Herzegovina      * (99→) *(99→)    
Bulgaria *          * 
Croatia   *        * 
Czech Republic      *  *     
Estonia *          * 
FYR Macedonia    *    *     
Georgia     *  *     
Hungary *        *   
Kazakhstan 99→   *  *   99→ 
Kyrgyz Republic      *    *   
Latvia 99→   *  *   99→ 
Lithuania     *  *     
Moldova     *  *     
Poland *        *   
Romania   *    *     
Russia     *  *     
Serbia and  
Montenegro  Serbia   Monten. *     
Slovak Republic  *          * 
Slovenia   *        * 
Tajikistan 99,  2002→  98, 2001    2000, 2001  2002→ 98,  99 
Turkmenistan   *    *     
Ukraine     *    *   
Uzbekistan   *    *     
     Source: EBRD Transition Reports (1998–2004) 
       Note:  MEBO = management employee buyout. 
       Data for Serbia and Montenegro are available only from 2003 
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   Table A.2.  Definitions and data sources of the variables included in the analysis 
 
VARIABLE NAME  SOURCE  DEFINITION 
Market capitalization  
to GDP 
WDI database  
(based on Standard & Poor’s 
Emerging Stock Markets 
Factbook) 
Share price times number of  
shares outstanding  
(% of GDP) 
Growth of value traded 
WDI database 
(based on Standard & Poor’s 
Emerging Stock Markets 
Factbook) 
Value traded refers to total value of 
shares traded during period 
(% of GDP) 
Turnover ratio 
WDI database;  
(based on Standard & Poor’s 
Emerging Stock Markets 
Factbook) 
Total value of shares traded during  
period divided by average market  
capitalization for period. 
New capital raised  http://www.fibv.com  capital raised by all listed companies  
(% of market capitalization) 
Mass privatization dummy 
variable 
EBRD, taxonomy of mass 
privatization 
dummy variable that equals one starting 
from the period when mass privatization 
was implemented as the primary or sec-
ondary privatization method in a given 
country  





    Table A.3.  Main descriptive statistics of stock market indicators used in the analysis 
 
Observati-
on/country  Variable Obs.  Country 
average  mi
n  max 
Mean  Standard 
deviation Median Min Max 
Market capitalization to 
GDP  151 20  7.55  2  13  10.8  10.66 7.9  0.004  53.2 
Growth in stocks traded  
(% of GDP)  102 17  6  1  12 0.6  2.81  -0.1 -1.0  25.1 
Turnover ratio   111  18  6.17  1  12  39  49.62  23.1  0.02  348 
New capital raised to 
market capitalization  81 14 5.79  2  9  0.001  0.005  2.8e-6  0  0.04 
     Source: Estimation data set, authors’ calculations. 
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Albania   x  X  x  x  x  9 
Armenia 5  X  4  x  6  x 
Azerbaijan 2  X  x  2  4  3 
Belarus x  X  x  x  x  10 
Bosnia and Herze-
govina  x X  x  x 4  x 
Bulgaria  8  4 4 7  x  8 
Croatia  8  7 7 2  x  6 
Czech  Republic  10  9 9 9  12   
Estonia  7  6 6 5  x  10 
FYR  Macedonia  6  5 3 x  x  x 
Georgia x  X  0  x  9  x 
Hungary   13  12  11  9  x  x 
Kazakhstan  5  3 3 2  5  5 
Kyrgyz Republic  2  X  1  x  10  x 
Latvia    8  5 7 6  6  5 
Lithuania  8  6 7 6  13  x 
Moldova  5  3 2 x  11  x 
Poland  12  9 12 9  x  x 
Romania  9  7 7 6  x  9 
Russia  12  9 8 2  12  x 
Slovak  Republic  10  9 9 7  x  12 
Slovenia  10  1 6 9  x  10 
Tajikistan  x  0 x x  x  2 
Turkmenistan  x  0 x x  x  x 
Ukraine  7  5 5 x  9  x 
Uzbekistan  4  2 x x  x  x 
No. of observations  151  102  111  81  101  89 
No.  of  countries  20  17 18 14  12  12 
Sources: WDI database, The World Federation of Exchanges, EBRD Transition Reports 
Note: “x” indicates data are unavailable. BOFIT Discussion Papers  http://www.bof.fi/bofit 
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